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I. INTRODUCTION 
A man walks into a store and buys a book, a CD, and computer software.  If 
this sounds like the setup to a bad joke, maybe it is.  When he walks out of the 
store, the man owns the book and CD.  He is free to read the book, listen to the 
CD, or resell either.  But what about the software?  Nearly all retail software is 
sold subject to ―shrink-wrap‖ agreements that state that the software is actually 
licensed, not sold.
1
  Under the terms of the license, the customer has no inherent 
right to use the software he just paid for—he can only use it to the extent that the 
software provider has granted him permission.  The license may also purport to 
restrict the customer‘s ability to resell the software.  The validity of shrink-wrap 
licenses is widely, if not universally, recognized.
2
  But do those licenses actually 
prevent ownership of a copy of software?  In other words, when a consumer 
purchases a computer program contained on a CD-ROM subject to terms of a 
license that purports to restrict ownership of the software or that copy of the 
software, does he own the particular copy of that software burned into that 
particular CD-ROM?  
The answer affects the consumer‘s rights under copyright law.  The exclusive 
right to copy, distribute, perform, and display copyrighted works
3
 is subject to 
two statutory limitations that allow certain uses to the ―owner‖ of a particular 
copy of a copyrighted work.
4
  The first sale doctrine, encoded at 17 U.S.C. § 109, 
permits the lawful ―owner of a particular copy‖ to sell it without the permission of 
the copyright owner.
5
  The ―essential step defense,‖ at 17 U.S.C. § 117, allows 
―the owner of a copy of a computer program‖ to make another copy either as an 
                                                          
1
 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1241 (1995). 
2
 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that terms of sale 
included with a mail-ordered computer inside the box were effective), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 
(1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that software license 
terms included in a retail box are enforceable except on grounds applicable to contracts in 
general); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (adopting 
the ProCD and Hill approach); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 
312–13 (Wash. 2000) (same).  But see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (invalidating the terms of a shrink-wrap license and holding that because a contract was 
formed by the parties‘ performance in ordering, shipping, and paying for software, the shrink-wrap 
license was merely a proposal for additional terms, which the purchaser was free to reject).  
3
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
4
 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (2006). 
5
 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (―Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.‖).   
2
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essential step in using that program or for archival purposes,
6
 or when the making 
of a copy is necessary for the maintenance and repair of a machine.
7
     
Although the word ―owner‖ is a crucial part of both sections, the Copyright 
Act does not define the term.  Courts facing §§ 109 or 117 ownership issues have 
had to determine for themselves what the word means.  This has not been difficult 
with traditional media—few cases have questioned whether a purchaser owns a 
book, record, or videotape.
8
  But computer software, because it is customarily 
―licensed,‖ not sold,
9
 poses ownership questions.  
Courts faced with a need to determine ownership of a copy have taken one of 
three approaches to resolving the question.  Some courts, perhaps believing the 
issue to be so well-settled that it merits no discussion, have categorically held that 
software is licensed, not sold, and that therefore the ―purchaser‖ of that software 
                                                          
6
  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a 
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or 
adaptation of that computer program provided:  
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is 
used in no other manner, or 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that 
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the 
computer program should cease to be rightful.  
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2006).  This limitation is especially important because of the ―RAM copy‖ 
doctrine. When a user installs and runs a computer program, that program is copied several 
times—for example, from CD-ROM to hard disk at installation, then from hard disk to random-
access memory (RAM) (with intermediate steps in video memory, CPU cache, and other 
components of the system architecture).  The ―RAM copy‖ doctrine holds that these copies made 
within a computer‘s infrastructure infringe the copyright holder‘s copyright if not authorized.  See 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
copy made in computer memory is sufficiently fixed to qualify as a copy under the Copyright 
Act).  Section 117(a) permits the owner of a particular copy of software to make any copies 
necessary to run the program.  Congress enacted § 117(c) in 1998 to exempt maintenance or repair 
of computer systems from the list of infringing activities, implicitly overruling MAI Systems.  See 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, § 302(3), 112 Stat. 2860, 2886; H.R. Rep. 
No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 27 (1998) (―The goal is to maintain undiminished copyright protection 
afforded under the Copyright Act to authors of computer programs, while making it possible for 
third parties to perform servicing of the hardware.‖). 
7
 17 U.S.C. § 117(c). 
8
 But see, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(determining that language on promotional CDs did not create a license and thus a subsequent sale 
was protected by the first sale doctrine); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(evaluating ownership of film prints). 
9
  See John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale 
Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25 (2004).   
3
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does not own the software or any copies of the software.
10
  Other courts have 
analyzed the question in more depth.  Some of these courts have reasoned that 
software licenses impose significant restrictions inconsistent with ownership, 
precluding consideration of a licensee as an ―owner of a copy‖ under §§ 109 or 
117.
11
  Yet other courts have looked beyond license terms to evaluate the 
economic realities of a software transaction; these courts have sometimes found a 
licensee to have ownership over a copy of software because the transaction more 
closely resembled a sale than a lease, rental, or other non-ownership transaction.
12
    
The split of authority on this issue does not divide along neat circuit or district 
court lines.  The Ninth Circuit—which encompasses Hollywood; Silicon Valley; 
Redmond, Washington; and other homes to software and entertainment 
businesses—has a rich set of conflicting precedent.  All the approaches described 
above have been used in Ninth Circuit district or appellate courts, with varying 
results that have led to conflicting authority within that Circuit.  Although other 
circuits have faced the ownership issue and come to varying conclusions, a 
resolution of these issues in the Ninth Circuit could go far towards leading other 
circuits to follow suit.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to 
do just that with three cases that were before it: UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Augusto,
13
 MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment,
14
 and Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc..
15
    
   This paper summarizes the three approaches that have been used to resolve 
questions of ownership under §§ 109 and 117 in the Ninth Circuit, with brief 
mention of other circuits that have followed each approach.  It then discusses the 
three cases the Ninth Circuit had on appeal, and argues that the Ninth Circuit 
should follow the ―economic realities‖ approach to find that most purchasers of 
retail software do in fact ―own‖ their copies of software, and thus should be able 
to invoke the first sale and essential step defenses. 
                                                          
10
 See infra Part II.A.1.  
11
 See infra Part II.A.2.  
12
 See infra Part II.A.3.  
13
 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
14
 No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 2757357 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008). 
15
 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (Vernor I) (W.D. Wash. 2008); No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 
3187613 (Vernor II) (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009). 
4
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II. CONFLICT WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. Precedent: Ownership Tests 
1.  The MAI Approach: A “License” Precludes Ownership 
At least one Ninth Circuit decision rejected a § 117 defense based purely on 
the characterization of a software transaction as a license.  MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc.,
16
 usually cited for its holding that software loaded into 
random-access memory (RAM) is sufficiently fixed to count as infringing,
17
 also 
included an important statement about § 117.   
The case was filed by computer manufacturer MAI after one of its employees 
left the company to join Peak, which operated a business maintaining and 
repairing MAI‘s computers in competition with MAI.
18
   As part of this service, 
Peak needed to use the computers.
19
  MAI argued that this use directly infringed 
MAI‘s copyright in the software because turning on the computer created a copy 
of the computer‘s operating system software in RAM.
20
  Peak countered that a 
copy in RAM was not ―fixed in any tangible medium of expression‖ as required 
by § 102,
21
 and that even if it were, Peak was entitled to use the software under 
the § 117 essential step defense.
22
   
In ruling that would be widely criticized,
23
 the court held that a copy in RAM 
met the fixation requirement.
24
  It also rejected Peak‘s § 117 defense, disposing of 
the ownership question in a footnote: ―Since MAI licensed its software, the Peak 
                                                          
16
 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
17
 See id. at 517–19; see e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Servs., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing MAI, 991 F.2d at 518); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. 
Express Co., No. C 92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994).  
18
 MAI, 991 F.2d at 513. 
19
 Id. at 518. 
20
 Id. at 517. 
21
 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (―Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known 
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.‖). 
22
 MAI, 991 F.2d at 519; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).  At the time of the MAI case, § 117 
lacked an exception for machine maintenance and repair.  Congress created that exception in 1998 
by enacting § 117(c).  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860, 2887 (1998).  
23
 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[B][1][c] 
(2010); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 547, 551 n.25 (1997) (citing numerous articles critical of the MAI decision). 
24
 MAI, 991 F.2d at 517–19. 
5
Graves: Who Owns a Copy?: The Ninth Circuit Misses an Opportunity to Reaf
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
[2:45 2011]             CYBARIS
®
, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 50 
customers do not quality as ‗owners‘ of the software and are not eligible for 
protection under § 117.‖
25
  The court did not discuss the difference between 
software and a copy of that software, nor did it examine the license terms.
26
   
The MAI approach therefore holds that no one who purchases software subject 
to a license agreement can be an ―owner‖ of the software.  This categorical 










2.  Wall Data: Significant Restrictions Under a License Preclude Ownership 
The second approach courts have used in evaluating ownership has been to 
ask whether the license terms are consistent with ownership.  These courts have 
held that any license that places significant restrictions on a transferee‘s use of a 
copy of the software is inconsistent with the customer‘s ownership of that copy.
31
    
The Ninth Circuit recently took this approach in Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department.
32
  The defendant in that case was a sheriff‘s 
                                                          
25
 Id. at 519 n.5. 
26
 See id. at 519.  
27
 See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(holding that ―given the substantial evidence that ISC only licensed and did not sell its copyrighted 
software, the first sale doctrine has no application to Altech as a matter of law‖). 
28
 See Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177–78 (E.D. 
Mo. 2004) (holding that an online game‘s terms of use and end user license agreement were 
enforceable under the UCC, in part because ―the defendants did not purchase the . . . software, 
rather they purchased a license for the software‖). 
29
 See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 213 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating, in a discussion noting that the defendant reseller had failed to prove a 
chain of title of software it resold, that ―[e]ntering a license agreement is not a ‗sale‘ for purposes 
of the first sale doctrine.‖). 
30
 See Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (S.D. 
Tex. 2000) (granting summary judgment against defendant who failed to produce ―any evidence, 
other than defendants' unsupported allegations, that Microsoft sells, rather than licenses, its 
software‖). 
31
 See, e.g., Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054–60 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (finding that an agreement that stated that it was a license agreement and that contained 
―numerous restrictions on title with respect to the end user‖ was a license, not a sale); Adobe Sys. 
Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089–92 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (analyzing the 
―intent of the parties in entering into the agreement, trade usage, the unique nature of distributing 
software, as well as the express restrictive language of the contract‖ in finding that a reseller 
agreement was a licensing agreement, not a sale). 
32
 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006). 
6
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department that had used the plaintiff‘s terminal emulation software.
33
  The 
department purchased several installation kits, each of which contained a CD-
ROM and licenses allowing installation of 250 copies of the software; the 
department later purchased additional installation licenses in bulk.
34
  Although the 
department had purchased only 3663 copies of the software, it installed over 6000 
copies in a way that prevented more than 3663 copies from being used at the same 
time.
35
   
When the software company sued, the department invoked the § 117 
―essential step‖ defense.
36
  It asked the trial court for a detailed jury instruction on 
the difference between a ―licensee‖ and an ―owner‖ under § 117, by which the 
jury could have determined whether the department was an owner of the copies of 
the software.
37
   Instead, the court gave an instruction that the jury could find that 
the department‘s use was infringing if the department proved ―by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it was the owner of a copy‖ of the software, with no further 
guidance on what constituted ownership of a copy.
38
   
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the jury instruction was not 
erroneous.
39
  In its discussion of the § 117 defense, the appellate panel cited MAI, 
interpreting MAI footnote to mean that ―if a software developer retains ownership 
of every copy of software, and merely licenses the use of those copies, § 117 does 
                                                          
33
 Id. at 774.  Terminal emulation software allows personal computers to connect to 
mainframe computers by emulating the communications protocols expected by the mainframe.  
9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MICROCOMPUTERS 196–98 (Allen Kent & James G. Williams eds., 1992).  
34
 Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 774.  The court‘s opinion does not say whether the further 
installation licenses were accompanied by additional copies of installation media. 
35
 Id. at 774–75.  
36
 Id. at 776.   
37
 Id. at 784–86.  Because the department had installed 6007 copies of the software, it is 
difficult to tell exactly which of those copies the department believed it owned.  The department 
might have claimed that it owned the physical installation media and 3663 use licenses, and that § 
117(a) protected its right to make as many copies as were necessary to allow it to use up to 3663 
copies at a time.  But that is not what it argued (possibly because the licenses would have clearly 
indicated that each permitted a single installation, not a single simultaneous use).  In its appellate 
brief, the department claimed that it purchased 3663 copies of the software and therefore owned 
that many copies. Brief for Appellant at 45, Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 447 
F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-56559), 2004 WL 2085188, at *45. The department did not 
explain which of the 6007 installed copies it thought were the 3663 it owned.  It argued that ―it 
generally is necessary to make another copy of software on one's computer, in addition to the 
tangible diskette or other medium that is purchased,‖ but failed to explain why making 2344 
additional copies was an ―essential step‖ to using the 3663.  See Brief for Appellant, supra, at 45–
46.  
38
 Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 784–86; Brief for Appellant, supra note 37, at 44. 
39
 Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 784. 
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not apply.‖
40
  Note the subtle shift in language.  In MAI, the court said that when a 
software publisher ―license[s] its software,‖ then its customers cannot ―qualify as 
‗owners‘ of the software.‖
41
  The Wall Data court recast that statement to more 
accurately reflect the requirements of § 117: when a software company retains 




The court did more than merely clarify the MAI footnote.  It also explained the 
conditions under which a software transaction should be considered a license 
instead of a sale: ―Generally, if the copyright owner makes it clear that she or he 
is granting only a license to the copy of software and imposes significant 
restrictions on the purchaser's ability to redistribute or transfer that copy, the 
purchaser is considered a licensee, not an owner, of the software.‖
43
  Thus, the 
court in Wall Data, like the MAI court, looked no further than the language of the 
license to determine ownership.  But in addition to looking at whether the 
purchase agreement characterized itself as a license, the Wall Data court 
considered a second factor: whether the agreement imposes ―significant 
restrictions‖ on the customer‘s use of copies of the software.
44
  In Wall Data, the 
court held that the licensing agreement contained restrictions that would not be 
imposed on an owner of the software.
45
  
Although the ―significant restrictions‖ test requires more inquiry into the 
nature of the license, the result is often the same as if the court had merely said 
that the agreement was a license and stopped there.  Most software licenses place 
significant restrictions on the customer‘s use of the copies—that is, after all, the 
entire purpose of licensing software.
46
  One study, for example, found that ninety-
                                                          
40
 Id. at 785.  The court also held, however, that even if the Sheriff‘s Department owned the 
copies of the software, making 6000 copies of software for which it had 3663 licenses was not an 
―essential step‖ of the operation of the software.  Id. at 785–86.  In a footnote, the court noted the 
criticism it had received for its MAI decision and recognized the impact that decision had on the 
applicability of the first sale doctrine to computer programs.  Id. at 785 n.9.  The court nonetheless 
refused to reconsider its early position because the Department‘s defense failed ―for a more 
fundamental reason—that hard drive imaging was not an essential step of installation—and thus 
any error [involving ownership was] harmless.‖  Id.   
41
 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
42






 Id.  The court also found that even if the defendant had been the owner of the software, 
installing multiple copies of the software was not an ―essential step‖ to the operation of the 
program, potentially reducing the court‘s ownership analysis to dicta.  See Id. at 785–86. 
46
 See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 1246–48. 
8
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three percent of the license agreements it surveyed contained restrictions on 
transfer.
47
  It is therefore little surprise that courts applying this test have found 
lack of ownership by the customer.
48
    
The Ninth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit appear to 
be the only courts to have applied this approach.
49
   
3.  United States v. Wise: Economic Realities of a Transaction May Establish 
Ownership 
The third approach applied by courts trying to determine ownership focuses 
on the surrounding economic realities of the transaction.  Under this approach, 
courts still examine the existence and terms of a license, but instead of asking 
whether that license puts significant restrictions on the customer‘s use, they ask 
whether the transaction as a whole more closely resembles a sale or some kind of 
non-sale transaction.    
One Ninth Circuit case that took this approach was United States v. Wise,
50
 a 
1977 criminal case about resold movie prints.  The defendant, Woodrow Wise, 
Jr., had been convicted of selling copyrighted 16mm and 35mm motion pictures.
51
  
Wise‘s defenses included authorization under the first sale doctrine.
52
  He argued 
that although the movie studios generally only licensed their films for a limited 
amount of time,
53
 in some cases the studios had actually transferred title in 
films.
54
    
The court examined several types of transactions by which movie studios 
distributed films: (1) distributions under license for theatrical exhibition, (2) 
distributions to television networks for broadcast, and (3) ―V.I.P. agreements‖ that 
                                                          
47
 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical 
Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 703 (2007), available 
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2007.00104.x/full. 
48
 See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
license agreement providing that when the licensor retained ―all rights of ownership,‖ that 
included the rights to ownership of physical copies); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 
216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054–60 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1089–92 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  
49
 See DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (concluding that agreements by a digital switching systems vendor limited the rights of the 
customers to transfer copies, and thus ―substantially limit[ed]‖ the customers‘ rights as compared 
with the rights owners would have). 
50
 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977). 
51
 Id. at 1183.  
52
 Id. at 1188–89.   
53
 Id. at 1184. 
54
 Id. at 1185. 
9
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allowed some actors to keep prints for personal use.
55
  Examining the details of 
the license agreements for theatrical exhibition, the court found that they all 
purported to transfer limited rights, prohibited the licensee from copying the 
films, required the return of the prints at the expiration of the contract terms, and 
often expressly reserved title to the prints in the movie studio.
56
   The court held 
these to be licenses rather than sales.
57
   
The court found that one of the television agreements was actually a sale.  The 
studio‘s grant to ABC of the right to broadcast the movie ―Funny Girl‖ lacked 
many of the features of the theatrical licenses.  The studio did not reserve title in 
the film, did not describe the contract as a ―license,‖ and did not otherwise restrict 
use of the print.
58
  The agreement‘s provision for return of the print was also 
different: instead of requiring return of the print, the agreement called for ABC to 
―offer‖ the prints back to the studio at a price to be negotiated.
59
  The court found 
that this provision in particular was similar to a ―sale-and-buy-back situation,‖ but 
that the nature of the buy-back provision did not matter because the agreement 
―clearly contemplate[d] the sale of a print to ABC at ABC‘s election.‖
60
  
Of the V.I.P. agreements, the court ruled three were licenses and one was a 
sale.  It held that agreements to provide Robert Redford with a print of ―The 
Sting,‖ Peter Bogdonavich with ―Paper Moon,‖ and Barbara Streisand with a 
copy of ―Funny Girl,‖ were all loans.
61
  These agreements reserved title to the 
films, granted limited rights to the licensees, used phrases like ―loaned‖ or granted 
―revocable, nonexclusive consent‖ to use the films, and required the licensees to 
retain the prints at all times.
62
  The agreement by which ―Camelot‖ was provided 
to Vanessa Redgrave also required her to retain the print in her possession at all 
times and not resell it.
63
  But Ms. Redgrave had paid a fixed sum for the cost of 
her print.
64
  Relying on this fact, the court found that the print of ―Camelot‖ 
provided to Vanessa Redgrave had been sold, not leased.
65
  ―[S]tanding alone,‖ 
the court wrote, the payment for the film did not establish a sale, but ―when taken 
with the rest of the language of the agreement,‖ the court found that the 
                                                          
55
 Id. at 1190–94. 
56
 Id. at 1190–91. 
57
 Id. at 1191. 
58
 See id. at 1191–92. 
59
 Id. at 1191. 
60
 See id. 
61








 See id. 
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transaction strongly resembled a sale.
66
  Because the government had not met its 
burden of proof in showing a lack of first sale, the court reversed the convictions 
involving ―Funny Girl‖ and ―Camelot.‖
67
  
The Wise approach is based on the notion that transfer agreements are often 
too complicated to easily label as ―sales‖ or ―licenses.‖
68
   ―[I]n each case,‖ 
therefore, ―the court must analyze the arrangement at issue and decide whether it 
should be considered a first sale.‖
69
  As shown in the Wise court‘s analysis of the 
film transfers, the language of the agreement is an important part of that decision.  
That court examined several features of the transfers based mainly on the 
language of the transfer agreements: whether the agreement explicitly reserved 
title; whether it used language consistent with a loan, rental, or sale; whether it 
allowed the transferee to keep the films forever or required their return; and, if the 
agreements contemplated return of the material, how and when the material was 
to be returned.
70
  The type and timing of payment was also a factor that, in Wise, 
was included in the language of the transfer agreements.
71
   
This differs from the Wall Data approach in two significant ways.  First, it 
considers the transfer agreement as a whole.  Wall Data‘s emphasis is primarily 
on the restrictions an agreement puts on the transferee.  Wise adds consideration 
of the transferee‘s rights under the agreement.  Second, nothing in the Wise 
decision suggests that the analysis must be limited to the language of the 
agreement.   
This approach has also been used by courts outside the Ninth Circuit.  The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals used a similar holistic approach in Krause v. 
Titleserv, Inc.
72
  That court rejected the idea that ―ownership‖ under § 117(a) 
required formal transfer of title.
73
  Instead, it phrased the issue as whether a 
transferee ―exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over a copy of the program 
to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy for purposes of § 117(a).‖
74
  In its 
decision, the court evaluated factors including the amount the customer paid for 
the software, the ownership of the server on which the software resided, and the 
customer‘s right to possess the software forever or destroy it at any time.
75
  




 See id. 
68
 Id. at 1188–89. 
69
 Id. at 1189 (quoting United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1975)). 
70
 See id. at 1190–94. 
71
 See id. at 1192. 
72
 See Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122–25 (2d Cir. 2005). 
73
 See id. at 123. 
74
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 have also used this approach.  Just as 
courts applying the Wall Data test have generally ruled that copyright owners 
retained ownership of copies,
78
 courts following Wise have often found that 
transactions described as licenses were actually sales.
79
   
B. Recent Cases Perpetuate the Conflict 
Precedent within the Ninth Circuit is confused and conflicted.  Three 
significant cases involving ownership of a copy have been decided in the Ninth 
Circuit in the past two years; true to form, the three district court cases came to 
different results on the ownership question.  The cases were all appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit and one was under consideration for en banc review at the time this 
article was written.  This section discusses the three cases and their holdings. 
1.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. 
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.
80
 involved resale of commercial software.  Timothy 
Vernor made his living selling items on eBay.
81
  Among the items Mr. Vernor 
sold were several copies of AutoCAD software, some of which he obtained 
through garage sales, and some that he bought at an office sale from architectural 
firm Cardwell/Thomas Associates (CTA).
82
  When Autodesk, the publisher of 
AutoCAD software, noticed the sales, it sent Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) takedown notices to eBay.
83
  After repeated notices from Autodesk, 
eBay suspended Mr. Vernor‘s account for one month.
84
  When Mr. Vernor 
contacted Autodesk to notify them that he had acquired the packages lawfully, 
                                                          
76
 See Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting 
summary judgment because the question of whether a software transaction transferred ownership 
was a question of material fact). 
77
 See Novell, Inc. v. CPU Distrib., No. H-97-2326, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9975, at *18–19 
(S.D. Tex. May 4, 2000) (holding that Novell‘s OEM agreements were sales, not licenses). 
78
 See supra note 48.  
79
 See, e.g., SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084–85 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding based on an examination of the ―economic realities‖ of an agreement 
that the ―circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly suggest[] that the transaction is in fact 
a sale rather than a license‖); In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding, in a 
bankruptcy case, that it was required to look to the ―economic realities‖ of a transaction to 
determine whether it was a sale or license, and that ―the fact that the agreement labels itself a 
‗license‘ and calls the payments ‗royalties,‘ did not control the analysis).  
80
 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (Vernor I) (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
81




 Id. at 1165–66. 
84
 Id. at 1166.   
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Autodesk replied that it does not permit the resale of its AutoCAD software.
85
  
After additional communications with Autodesk, Mr. Vernor eventually filed suit 
seeking a declaratory judgment that his activities were non-infringing.
86
  
Mr. Vernor argued that his activities were permitted by the first sale doctrine.  
Because Mr. Vernor had purchased the software from a third party, not directly 
from Autodesk, the applicability of the first sale doctrine depended on the nature 
of CTA‘s acquisition of the AutoCAD software.  As part of the ―settlement of an 
unrelated dispute,‖ CTA had paid just over $44,000 to Autodesk and received ten 
packages of AutoCAD.
87
  The settlement agreement contained typical license 
agreement terms: it granted a ―nonexclusive, nontransferable license‖ to use the 
program, imposed restrictions on the number of computers on which the software 
could be installed, and prohibited renting, leasing, or transferring the software.
88
  
Mr. Vernor eventually purchased four of these copies.
89
 
The district court issued two opinions in the case: the first rejecting 
Autodesk‘s motion to dismiss,
90
 the second granting partial summary judgment to 
Mr. Vernor.
91
  Both decisions discussed Mr. Vernor‘s ownership for purposes of 
the § 109 defense.  The latter decision, because it is more complete, is the one that 
will be focused on here.  
There was no question that Autodesk could have enforced its license terms 
against CTA in contract, but Mr. Vernor had not entered into any agreement with 
Autodesk.
92
  Thus, the question was whether CTA‘s sale to Mr. Vernor—although 
a potential breach of contract by CTA—was authorized under the first sale 
doctrine.
93
  That required determining whether CTA, not Mr. Vernor, had 




The district court found a conflict of authority in the Ninth Circuit over the 
determination of ownership of a copy.
95
  One the one hand, United States v. Wise 
―establishes that even a transfer that places severe restrictions on the use and 
disposition of a copy of copyrighted material can transfer ownership of that 










 Id. at 1165. 
90
 Id. at 1176. 
91
 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613, at *1 (W.D. 
Wash. Sept. 30, 2009). 
92
 Vernor I, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1175–76.  
93
 See id. at 1168–69. 
94
 See id. 
95
 Vernor II, 2009 WL 3187613, at *5. 
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copy.‖
96
  But three later cases, MAI, Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express 
Co.,
97
 and Wall Data were ―more deferential to the characterization of a 
transaction as a mere license.‖
98
   
The district court noted that the Wise court had considered several factors in 
its analysis of whether film transfer agreements were sales.
99
  The Vernor II court 
explained that most of the Wise factors were ambiguous because they appeared in 
both agreements that the Wise court ruled were sales and agreements that the Wise 
court ruled were licenses.
100
  Clauses retaining title in the print to the copyright 
owner, up-front payments, and agreements by the transferee to destroy transferred 
copies were all features of both licenses and sales in Wise.
101
   Of those 
ambiguous factors, reservation of title was the closest to being a clear factor; the 
district court found only one ―likely‖ case in which an agreement with an express 
reservation of title was held to be a sale: Vanessa Redgrave‘s copy of ―Camelot,‖ 
which was also subject to a one-time payment.
102
  The Vernor II court found that 
only one of the factors examined by the Wise court had been determinative in that 
case: whether the recipient had the right to perpetual possession.
103
   In Wise, the 
agreements allowing the recipient to keep his or her copy indefinitely were 
transfers of ownership.
104




Applying this determinative factor, the district court held that the AutoCAD 
license was a transfer of ownership.
106
  The court described the license as a 
―hodgepodge of terms that . . . support both a transfer of ownership and a mere 
license.‖
107
  The license contained an express reservation of title to Autodesk, but 
                                                          
96
 Id. (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190–93 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
97
 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).  Triad, like MAI, was a case about whether third-party 
computer service companies infringed a computer manufacturer‘s software.  See id. at 1333.  
Triad was neither a § 109 or § 117 case, aside from a brief note that certain customers to whom 
Triad had undisputedly sold, rather than leased, its software were entitled to § 117 protection.  Id.  
But it includes a statement about ownership similar to the one in MAI—appropriately enough, also 
in a footnote.  See id. at 1337 n.18 (―[I]t appears that the majority of Triad computer owners are 
subject to license agreements and do not own their software outright.‖).   
98
 Vernor II, 2009 WL 3187613, at *5. 
99






 Id. at *7.  The court calls this a ―likely‖ case because it infers the presence of a reservation 
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gave Autodesk no right to regain possession of the copies of the software.
108
  
CTA had obtained the software through a single up-front payment.
109
  And 
although Autodesk claimed that older versions of software had to be returned as a 
condition of upgrading, the court held that because customers could choose 
whether to upgrade, Autodesk had no right to demand that customers return 
copies of its software.
110
  Although the terms were mixed, the district court found 
the license terms to be similar to the Redgrave contract and ruled that CTA had 
received ownership of the AutoCAD packages.
111
  
The district court acknowledged the MAI, Triad, and Wall Data cases
112
 but 
found them to be in irreconcilable conflict with Wise.
113
  The court rejected the 
argument that the MAI trio could be distinguished from Wise by the fact that the 
former cases interpreted § 117 while the latter was a first sale case examining the 
statutory predecessor to § 109.
114
  Examining legislative history, the court found 
that the word ―owner‖ had the same meaning when both sections were adopted 
and that Congress had taken pains to avoid changing the ―owner‖ language—for 
example, by amending § 109 to bar software rental rather than by changing the 
―owner‖ language in § 117 to indicate that software licensees were not owners.
115
   
Lacking any way to reconcile the conflict, the district court held that it was 
required to follow the earlier panel decision—Wise.
116
  
The court‘s emphasis on perpetual possession appeared to be a significant 
victory for software customers.  Most retail software transactions, which are 
purchased in single transactions and do not require return of the physical media to 
the publisher, would likely be classified as sales under this analysis.  Some courts, 
however, have criticized an emphasis on perpetual possession as ―simplistic.‖
117
  








 Id. at *8. 
112
 Id. at *9–11.  
113
 Id. at *11. 
114




 Id. at *11. 
117
 See, e.g., DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
One commentator has argued that when a copy of a software program is 
transferred for a single payment and for an unlimited term, the transferee should 
be considered an ―owner‖ of the copy of the software program regardless of 
other restrictions on his use of the software. See Raymond T. Nimmer, THE LAW 
OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ¶ 1.24[1], at 1-143 to 1-144 (3d ed.1997).  That 
view has not been accepted by other courts, however, and we think it overly 
simplistic. 
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Autodesk appealed.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the decision 
of the district court.
118
  The court of appeals found that Wise and the MAI trio of 
cases were reconcilable.
119
  The court interpreted Wise as considering whether the 
agreement was labeled a license and whether ―the copyright owner retained title 
to the copy, required its return or destruction, forbade its duplication, or required 
the transferee to maintain possession of the copy for the agreement‘s duration.‖
120
  
It described Wall Data as holding that § 117 did not apply ―where the copyright 
owner grants the user a license and significantly restricts the user‘s ability to 
transfer the software.‖
121
  Based on this interpretation of Wise and the MAI trio, 
the court of appeals held that a person holds only a license to a copy of software 
when the copyright owner ―(1) specifies that a user is granted a license, (2) 
significantly restricts the user‘s ability to transfer the software, and (3) imposes 
notable use restrictions.‖
122
   
Because Autodesk‘s licensing agreement stated that the license was 
nontransferable, prohibited transfer or lease of the software without Autodesk‘s 
permission, prohibited modifying or reverse-engineering the software, and 
provided for termination of the license for non-compliance with its terms, the 
court found that Autodesk had reserved title to the copies of software and 
imposed significant transfer and use restrictions.
123
  The court therefore held that 
CTA had been a licensee of the copies of the software, and that neither CTA nor 
Mr. Vernor was entitled to resell the software under the first sale doctrine.
124
  
The court of appeals rejected several arguments in favor of finding that CTA 
had owned copies of the software.  It held that the right to continual possession 
was not the ―key factor‖ in Wise, but merely one part of a ―multi-factor balancing 
test.‖
125
  The court held that its application of a different approach than the 
Second Circuit used in Krause v. Titleserve did not create a circuit split.
126
  It 
factually distinguished Krause, which involved an employer-employee 
relationship with no written license agreement where the employer had been paid 
―significant consideration‖ in exchange for which the employee had allowed the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Id. 
118
 See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
119
 Id. at 1111. 
120
 Id. at 1109. 
121
 Id. at 1110. 
122
 Id. at 1110–11. 
123
 Id. at 1111–12. 
124
 Id. at 1112. 
125
 Id. at 1113. 
126
 Id. at 1113–14.  The Ninth Circuit also held that its holding did not conflict with the 
Federal Circuit‘s decision in DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which used a ―significant restrictions‖ approach.   
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employer to use the programs ―forever.‖
127
  The court also dismissed Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus
128
 as non-controlling because the 1908 Supreme Court case 
did not address ―whether the right to use software is distinct from the ownership 




The Ninth Circuit‘s three-part test is essentially the ―significant restrictions‖ 
approach.  The test adds consideration of restrictions on transfer as well as use 
and adds the MAI inquiry into whether an agreement is labeled a ―license.‖  But 
the emphasis of the test is still on the language of the license agreement.   The 
Ninth Circuit‘s approach does not consider any factors outside the language of the 
agreement itself.     
As of the date this article was written, the Ninth Circuit had not yet announced 
whether it would grant Mr. Vernor‘s petition to rehear the case en banc. 
2.  UMG v. Augusto 
The second of the three cases to be decided was UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Augusto,
130
 a case arising out of the second-hand sale of promotional CDs.  UMG, 
like many record companies, regularly sends promotional copies of its CDs to 
―music industry insiders.‖
131
  Each CD is labeled with language to the effect that 
the CD is the property of the record company, that the CD is licensed for 
promotional use only, and that resale is prohibited.
132
  Tony Augusto, even though 
he was not a music industry insider, obtained promotional CDs and auctioned 
them through eBay.
133
  UMG discovered the auctions, sent DMCA takedown 
notices,
134
 and, after Mr. Augusto initiated more auctions, filed suit against 
him.
135
   On a motion for summary judgment, Augusto argued that the first sale 
doctrine protected his activities.
136
  
                                                          
127
 Id. at 1114. 
128
 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
129
 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350).  Bobbs-Merrill involved 
an attempt by a publisher to restrict resale through inclusion of a statement (placed below a 
copyright notice) purporting to control the prices at which books could be resold.  Bobbs-Merrill, 
210 U.S. at 341–42.  The Court did not explicitly evaluate whether the language created a license.     
130
 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
131






 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (2006). 
135
 Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. 
136
 See id. at 1059. 
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The district court began its analysis of the ownership issue by declaring that it 
had to analyze the question according to the ―economic realities‖ of the 
transaction.
137
  The factors it considered in determining those economic realities 
were (1) whether the arrangement showed that the copyright owner intended to 
regain possession, (2) whether the copyright owner received any recurring benefit 
from the recipient‘s continued possession, and (3) whether a licensing 
arrangement would have had any benefit to the copyright owner other than 
restraining trade.
138
   In examining the first factor, the court discussed Wise—
particularly the difference a right to perpetual possession made to the results in 
that case.
139
  The court found that UMG granted perpetual possession to the 
recipients of its promotional CDs.
140
  The licensing labels said nothing about 
returning the CDs, there were ―no consequences for the recipient should she lose 
or destroy‖ the CDs, and UMG had made no efforts to regain possession of the 
CDs.
141
   The second factor also weighed in favor of ownership: UMG gained no 
benefit from the CD recipients‘ continued possession.  In fact, in the court‘s view, 
UMG had no guarantees that it would receive any benefit from sending free 
promotional CDs.
142
  Finally, the court held that the only benefit to UMG of 
licensing its CDs was to limit transfer of its music—a purpose courts have long 
rejected as unjustified.
143
  Taking these factors into account, the court agreed with 
Augusto that the promotional CDs had been given as gifts under federal law,
144
 
and that the first sale doctrine protected his activities.
145
  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the district 
court.
146
   The court, examining the circumstances of the sale, held that UMG‘s 
distribution of the CDs did not create a license.
147
  It noted that no effort was 
made to keep track of particular copies of CDs or what use was made of them.
148
  
                                                          
137
 See id. at 1060. 
138
 See id. at 1060–62. 
139






 See id. 
143
 See id. at 1061–62 (citing Bobbs-Merill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); RCA Mfg. Co. 
v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940)). 
144




 Id. at 1065. The court also noted that the first sale doctrine does not actually require a 
sale—only that title passes by an ―authorized disposition‖ of a copy.  Id. at 1059.  Thus, a gift can 
exhaust the copyright owner‘s distribution rights to the copy given away.  The court also held that 
Augusto did not have to trace a chain of title from him back to UMG, implicitly rejecting the 
analysis of Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 213 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).  See Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.  
146
 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
147
 Id. at 1180–82. 
148
 Id. at 1180. 
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The court also found that UMG‘s efforts to create a license were ineffective 
because the language ―Promotional Use Only—Not for Sale‖ did not explicitly 
purport to create a license.  It concluded that there was no evidence that the 
recipients of the CDs had accepted any license—they could not be presumed to 
have entered an agreement merely by their lack of response on receiving the 
CDs.
149
      
3.  MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. 
A District of Arizona court reached a quite different result when analyzing 
ownership of client software for an online game.  In MDY Industries v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc.,
150
 the publisher of the popular World of Warcraft (WoW) 
game sued the creator of ―WowGlider,‖ a ―bot‖ program that could automatically 
play the game while a player was away from his or her computer.
151
  Blizzard 
argued that the copy of WoW made in RAM by players using WowGlider directly 
infringed its copyright because that use exceeded the scope of WoW‘s End User 
License Agreement (EULA) and Terms of Use.
152
  Blizzard‘s claim against MDY 




MDY countered that there was no direct infringement, in part because of § 
117(a)(1).
154
   The court disagreed with MDY.
155
  It found that the decisions in 
MAI, Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,
156
 and Wall Data 
controlled.
157
  The court described the Wall Data test as having two parts: (1) 
whether the copyright holder makes clear that it is only granting a license to the 
copy of the software, and (2) whether the license imposes significant restrictions 
on the use of transfer of the copy.
158
  Applying this test, the court found that 
WoW‘s EULA granted a ―limited license‖ and that the license imposed 
restrictions on the transfer and use of the game software.
159
  
                                                          
149
 Id. at 1182. 
150
 No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 2757357 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008). 
151
 Id. at *2. 
152




 Id. at *8 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (1998)). 
155
 See id. at *10. 
156
 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).  
157
 See MDY, 2008 WL 2757357, at *8. 
158
 See id. at *8.  Note that the MDY court omitted any requirement that the ―significant 
restrictions‖ be inconsistent with ownership. 
159
 See id. at *8–9. 
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The language of the EULA was clearly a deciding factor in this case.  At one 
point in the decision, the court noted ―the license is clear from notices on the box 
purchased at the retailer and from a paper copy of the EULA contained in the box, 
as well as from the online notices that appear when the game client software is 
installed on a personal computer,‖ and wondered ―what more could be done to 
make clear that the purchaser is a licensee, not an owner, of the software.‖
160
  
Clearly, the court‘s approach valued the language of the licensing agreement 
above all else.  
The court rejected MDY‘s argument that it should follow the Wise and Vernor 
approach.
161
  It explained that those two cases dealt with a § 109 defense, not § 
117, and that Wall Data had explicitly declined to reconsider the MAI 
approach.
162
  It also held that its decision would be the same under Wise because, 
in the court‘s interpretation of that case, a transaction is a license where either 
―the recipient is required to return the copy to the copyright owner or the 
copyright owner retains title to the copy.‖
163
  Thus, the court implied that it would 
read Wise as allowing for an analysis based purely on the text of a license 
agreement.  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel applied the test announced in the Vernor 
panel decision and determined that WoW players were licensees of ―the game 
client software.‖
164
  The court noted several aspects of the EULA that led it to that 
conclusion, including Blizzard‘s reservation of title in the software and imposition 
of transfer restrictions and use restrictions.
165
  The transfer provisions of the 
EULA generally allowed transfer of the software, but only if users transferred all 
original packaging and documentation, permanently deleted all copies of the 
game client, and transferred the software to a recipient who also accepted the 
license agreement.
166
  The use restrictions included prohibiting commercial use of 
the software or use in ―cyber cafes and computer gaming centers without 
Blizzard‘s permission.‖
167
   The EULA also, of course, proscribed the concurrent 
use of ―unauthorized third-party programs‖ such as WowGlider.
168
  The court also 
noted that the EULA allowed Blizzard to modify the client software remotely 
                                                          
160
 Id. at *9. 
161
 See id. at *10. 
162
 See id. at *10 n.7 (citing Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 447 F.3d 769, 785 n. 
9 (9th Cir. 2006)).  The MDY court did not mention that the Wall Data court‘s discussion of 
ownership was not essential to the outcome of the case.  Id.; see also discussion supra note 40.  
163
 MDY, 2008 WL 2757357, at *10 n.7. 
164










Cybaris®, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol2/iss1/4
[2:45 2011] Who Owns a Copy?: 65 
The Ninth Circuit Misses an Opportunity  
To Reaffirm The Right to Use and Resell Digital Works 
 
 
without the player‘s knowledge or permission.
169
   The court held that because the 
users of WoW were licensees, they could not use the essential step defense and 




III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT THE 
―ECONOMIC REALITIES‖ TEST, AND THE FORM THAT TEST SHOULD TAKE 
When these three cases were before it, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had 
an opportunity to clarify the law regarding ownership of copies of software.  
Now, the Ninth Circuit should grant en banc review of Vernor and, although it has 
previously declined to do so, reverse its statement in MAI and apply the Wise and 
Vernor ―economic realities‖ test.  That test is more flexible, consistent with the 
purposes of the first sale doctrine, compatible with the increasingly digital nature 
of works of authorship, and in line with the historical aversion to restrictions on 
the first sale doctrine. 
A. Problems with the MAI and Wall Data Approaches 
1.  MAI’s Categorical Approach 
The MAI ―test‖ should die a quiet, peaceful death.  Although it is simple to 
apply, its problems far outweigh the benefits of a convenient bright-line rule.  
The first problem is its conclusory treatment of a not-so-simple question.  
Although the footnote in which the MAI court mentions ownership is not, strictly 
speaking, dictum because it was essential to the ruling in the case, the statement‘s 
brevity and its relegation to a mere footnote suggests that the court did not 
consider the ownership issue important nor spend significant time contemplating 
it.  The footnote‘s language about licensed ―software‖ instead of copies of 
software
171
 further suggests that the court did not thoroughly consider the issue.
172
  
MAI also places too much emphasis on magic words in an agreement, rather 
than on the nature of the agreement.
173
  Under the MAI approach, the mere fact 






 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993). 
172
 See, e.g., 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 8.08[B][1][c] (2010) (discussing flaws in 
the MAI court‘s analysis); Lemley, supra note 23, at 551 (noting several problems in the MAI 
opinion). 
173
 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association et. al, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 
No. 09-35969, at 5 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
vernor_v_autodes/VernorAmicus.pdf. 
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that a transfer agreement is called a license is enough to say that the transferee is 
not an owner—regardless of the extent to which the agreement does or does not 
limit the transferee‘s use and possession.
174
   
Finally, MAI misses the difference between software and a particular copy of 
the software.
175
  A license need not treat both equally; it could reserve rights to 
the software but convey ownership of any physical copies of that software.
176
  The 
confusion exhibited by some courts who have faced this issue—or, more 
charitably, the imprecision with which they address it—is hard to explain.  Courts 
that have had no difficulty distinguishing between an audiovisual work and a 
videotape, or a sound recording and a record,
177
 too often seem to fall into a haze 
of confusion when confronted with computer software.
178
  Putting MAI to rest 
would invalidate a precedent that too often contributes to this confusion.
179
 
2.  “Significant Restrictions” 
Wall Data‘s ―significant restrictions‖ approach—largely adopted in three-part 
form by the Ninth Circuit in Vernor
180
—is better than MAI‘s approach, but not by 
much.  It looks further into the nature of the transfer agreement while retaining 
most of the MAI test‘s simplicity of application, but it still suffers from shaky case 
precedent and is ultimately an example of circular reasoning.  
Wall Data improves on MAI by looking into the language of the agreement 
instead of its label.
181
  Despite the deeper inquiry, it retains some of MAI‘s 
                                                          
174
 See MAI, 991 F.2d at 519 n.5.  Although the court examined the license agreement, it did 
so to illustrate that any copying done by Peak was outside the scope of MAI‘s license agreement 
with its customers, and thus unauthorized for purposes of an infringement analysis. 
175
 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (―Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is 
embodied.‖). 
176
 See Rothchild, supra note 9, at 28–33. 
177
 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. C.I.R., 311 F.3d 1178, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the 
difference under the copyright code between content and media). 
178
 See, e.g., MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir. 
1993) (confusing licensed software with the requirement for ownership of a copy of software in 
stating that because ―MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as ―owners‖ of 
the software and are not eligible for protection under § 117‖ (emphasis added)); Microsoft Corp. 
v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (stating that the 
defendant had failed to produce ―any evidence . . . that Microsoft sells, rather than licenses, its 
software‖) (emphasis added); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 8.08[B][1][c] 
(discussing confusion by some courts ―between copyright ownership and ownership of the 
physical copy.‖). 
179
 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 8.08[B][1][c]. 
180
 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
181
 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.  
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appealing simplicity.  A court can focus on the terms of the license agreement and 
often ignore more complicated extrinsic factors.
182
  But the ―significant 
restrictions‖ approach is not as simple as it might seem.  Determining whether a 
license agreement imposes limitations that are inconsistent with ownership brings 
the whole analysis back to the original question: ―What is ownership?‖  If a court 
is trying to determine whether a person is the owner of a copy of software, it is of 
little help to suggest that a person is an owner when she has rights that are 
consistent with ownership.  But that, reduced to its fundamentals, is the 
―significant restrictions‖ approach.  
The ―significant restrictions‖ test is circular in another way.  What the 
software customer really cares about is whether she can legally transfer or use 
copies of software she bought.  Sections 109 and 117 of the copyright code say 
that she can do so if she owns those copies.  The ―significant restrictions‖ test 
says that one is an owner of a copy only if that copy was not transferred subject to 
a license that imposes significant restrictions on transfer or use of copies of the 
software.
183
  The logical result of all those statements is this: under the 
―significant restrictions‖ approach, a software purchaser is entitled to transfer or 
use a copy of software if the license allows her to transfer or use the software.   
If this were the law, it would make §§ 109 and 117 moot. Obviously, anyone 
can make a legal copy when she has permission.  But it is a basic canon of 
statutory interpretation that when Congress passes legislation, it intends it to have 
some effect.
184
  For these sections to have any use, they must apply even in 
situations where a copyright holder would prefer that they did not.  
The ―significant restrictions‖ test errs in its reliance on limitations on use.  
Wall Data reasoned that limitations on use are inconsistent with ownership.
185
  
But ownership does not always confer absolute rights to use the property in 
whatever way the owner desires.
186
  For example, one may own real property 
subject to easements and zoning restrictions, or own a CD but not be permitted to 
make copies of it or play it publicly.  Furthermore, a test based on the existence of 
                                                          
182
 But see, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One-Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (finding the terms of a license agreement ambiguous enough to merit consideration of 
extrinsic evidence). 
183
 Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006). 
184
 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (noting the ―elementary canon of 
construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative‖).  
185
 See Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sherriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006). 
186
 See 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:25 (2010). 
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significant restrictions in a license will, as a practical matter, always find those 
restrictions present, making the test little more useful than the MAI approach.
187
    
The ease with which the ―significant restrictions‖ approach finds a software 
transaction to be a license is inconsistent with the policy purposes behind the first 
sale doctrine.  The first sale doctrine promotes the ―[p]rogress of [s]cience and the 
useful [a]rts‖
188
 by allowing a secondary market in copyrighted works, 
decentralizing control over copyrighted works, and otherwise reflecting society‘s 
distaste for restraints on alienation.
189
  The main purpose of software licenses, 
however, is to stifle secondary markets.
190
 Although software publishers benefit 
when software is considered to be licensed rather than sold,
191
 only some of those 
benefits are legitimate.  Preventing resale is not a legitimate purpose because it is 
directly opposed to the first sale doctrine‘s purpose of encouraging a secondary 
market.
192
  When evaluating a § 109 defense, therefore, a court should not be too 
eager to find that a license prevents resale.  
The ubiquity of the licensing model in software might lead one to wonder 
whether copyright owners in more traditional media could likewise restrict 
secondary markets in their works by conveying their products subject to 
restrictive licenses.  Could the author of a book prevent resale by including a 
―license‖ inside the front cover?  Could a music publisher enforce a statement on 
its records that they could not be resold?  The answer is ―no.‖  Attempts to license 
around the first sale doctrine in traditional media were rejected long ago.  Over a 
                                                          
187
 See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 47, at 703 (discussing standard limitations in software 
license agreements). 
188
 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
189
 See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy 
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1291 (2001) (describing the first sale doctrine as 
originally stemming from ―the common law reluctance to enforce restraints on the alienation of 
physical property‖ and noting that ―such restraints were generally disfavored because they 
hindered the free exchange of property and its eventual transfer to its most socially productive 
uses‖). 
190
 See Rothchild, supra note 9, at 26 (―Representatives of the software industry have been 
candid in acknowledging that the main purpose of characterizing transactions involving their 
products as leases rather than sales is to defeat the exhaustion of their distribution right that would 
otherwise result through application of the first-sale doctrine.‖). 
191
 See Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sherriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 786 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(―By licensing copies of their computer programs, instead of selling them, software developers 
maximize the value of their software, minimize their liability, control distribution channels, and 
limit multiple users on a network from using software simultaneously.‖ (citing Christian H. 
Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” Really Sales, and How 
will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 567–88 (2004)). 
192
 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 8.12[A] (stating that when a first sale has 
occurred, ―the policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to the policy opposing 
restraints of trade and restraints on alienation.‖). 
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hundred years ago, for example, one of the earliest cases on the first sale doctrine, 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,
193
 rejected an attempt by a book publisher to place 
conditions on resale.
194
  Restraints on resale of records were also rejected over 
seventy years ago, in RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman.
195
  The Ninth Circuit 
recognized this in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,
196
 but seems to treat 
software as a special case.    
Although software seemed special thirty years ago because it was easy to 
perfectly copy and its status under copyright was uncertain,
197
 that is no longer the 
case.  Music, books, movies, and television shows are now available in digital 
form, but few types of copyrighted works other than software are distributed 
subject to license agreements.
198
  If software publishers could use licenses to 
restrict secondary markets, it would seem the authors of books, CDs, and movies 
could do the same.  But attempts to avoid the first sale doctrine in these media 
through licensing have already been rejected.  Software no longer needs a special 
exception to the general rule that copyright owners may not bypass the first sale 
doctrine by selling their works subject to agreements that forbid resale.   
Finally, Wall Data is poor precedent for its holdings on ownership of a copy.  
The sheriff‘s department did not have a strong § 117 defense, primarily because 
there was little chance the court would have found that installing 2344 extra 
copies of a program was an essential step to using the 3663 authorized copies.
199
  
It is therefore possible that the court disposed of the ownership question without 
devoting to it the full measure of rigor a more plausible § 117 defense might have 
merited.  The court seems to admit as much when it explained that it would not 
revisit its MAI holding despite criticism, in part because the § 117 defense would 
                                                          
193
 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
194
 See id. at 350 (―In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the 
copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by 
notice . . . a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom 
there is no privity of contract.‖).   
195
 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). 
196
 628 F.3d 1175, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing Bobbs-Merrill and noting that ―the 
rule of Bobbs-Merrill remains in full force.‖).   
197
 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that computer object code was copyrightable).  
198
 Rothchild, supra note 9, at 49.  E-books are a notable recent exception.  See Michael 
Seringhaus, Note, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 172–75 (2009). 
199
 See Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sherriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 774–75 (9th Cir. 2006); 
discussion supra note 37. 
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fail on the ―essential step‖ element anyway.
200
  The Wall Data analysis of the 
ownership question was also based on weak precedent: a statement in MAI that 
seemed to have been made almost in passing.
201
  In short, Wall Data‘s holding on 
ownership was built hastily and unnecessarily on a shaky foundation.  
B. The Economic Realities Test 
An appropriate test for evaluating ownership of a copy under §§ 109 and 117 
should serve the policy purposes of both sections.  For the first sale doctrine, that 
means the ownership test should prevent copyright owners from using their 
exclusive rights to stifle secondary markets in their works.
202
  For the essential 
step defense, it means ensuring that purchasers of software may use the programs 
that they bought.
203
  But the test should also encourage innovation and permit 
alternate transfer arrangements to the extent that those purposes do not conflict 
with the purposes of the first sale and essential step doctrines.  The test that best 
meets all of these objectives is the ―economic realities‖ approach used by the 
Ninth Circuit in Wise, and by separate district courts in Vernor and Augusto.   
Those cases, though using the same general approach, weighed different 
factors.  In Vernor II the district court, in its analysis of the Wise decision, zeroed 
in on the circumstances of possession as the key feature distinguishing licenses 
from sales.
204
  In Augusto, the district court considered possession rights, but also 
examined the benefits the copyright owner could expect to receive from using a 
licensing agreement.
205
  Other factors not considered by either court could also be 
useful in determining the realities of a transaction.  
This article proposes a multi-factor ―economic realities‖ test based on the 
factors considered by both courts, plus other factors that would be relevant to the 
inquiry.  The test would determine ownership based on (1) the language of the 
                                                          
200
 See Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 785 n.9 (―We decline to revisit our precedent in this case, 
because the Sheriff's Department's ‗essential step‘ defense fails for a more fundamental reason—
that hard drive imaging was not an essential step of installation—and thus any error is harmless.‖). 
201
 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993); see 
also discussion supra Part III.A.1.  
202
 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 8.12[A].  This policy is based on the rationale 
that copyright law is meant to encourage distribution of works; allowing copyright owners to 
enforce limitations on resale would hinder distribution rather than encourage it.  Id. 
203
 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259–61 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing 
the history of § 117); FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 1 (1979) (recommending that the copyright law be amended to 
―ensure that rightful possessors of copies of computer programs may use or adapt these copies for 
their use‖).   
204
 See supra text accompanying notes 99–111. 
205
 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1060–62 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  
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transfer agreement as to possession, (2) the copyright owner‘s intent to regain 
possession, (3) whether the copyright owner benefits from the recipient‘s 
continued possession, (4) any legitimate purposes behind a license agreement 
other than restraining trade, (5) whether the recipient is entitled to perpetual use of 
the software, (6) whether a requirement that the copyright owner actually regain 
possession of the physical media would create an undue burden, and (7) any other 
relevant factors.   
Including the language of the transfer agreement as to possession incorporates 
Vernor II‘s observation that although perpetual possession alone does not 
determine ownership, it is a strong indicator.  The factors involving intent to 
regain possession, benefit from possession, and legitimate purpose are all taken 
from the district court in Augusto.
206
   
The perpetual use and undue burden factors do not appear in any case.  Their 
inclusion in the factors for consideration reflects the reality that software 
transactions may be structured in many ways.  For example, a publisher might 
distribute software on a CD-ROM subject to a limited-term lease arrangement.  
After a year, if the customer did not renew her subscription, she would no longer 
be authorized to use the software.  A ruling that she ―owned‖ the copy of the 
software on the CD would allow her to sell it or continue using it despite lack of 
authorization.  It would be inefficient in such a circumstance to require the 
software publisher to retrieve the CD just to prevent the customer from being 
considered the owner of that copy of software.
207
  Including perpetual use and 
undue burden as factors in the ownership equation would allow courts to treat 
these situations flexibly.   
The factors listed above may seem distressingly similar to other multi-factor 
tests that require courts to evaluate the totality of the circumstances.  Critics 
charge that such tests lend little predictability and often translate into courts doing 
whatever they want to do.
208
  But as is often the case when such tests are used, 
simpler tests suffer from too many flaws.  A test that merely considered whether a 
software purchaser had the right to perpetual possession, for example, would stifle 
innovation, be easily skirted through language in a license, and ignore the fact that 
ownership is more complex than a bright-line rule can accurately capture.  
                                                          
206
 See id. at 1061–62. 
207
 Note, however, that this is now something of an unlikely scenario.  A publisher 
contemplating a lease arrangement would probably use software activation codes that would de-
activate at the end of the lease period.  The customer would have a CD with unusable software on 
it, and her legal ability to sell or use the software on that CD would be a moot point. 
208
 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1182 (1989) (writing that when a judge says that an issue requires a balancing of all the factors 
involved, ―he begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a determiner of law‖). 
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Nor does the proposed test unduly limit software publishers‘ rights.  They can 
still enter into contracts obligating purchasers to refrain from resale or transfer.  
But the cause of action for a breach of that agreement would be against the first 
buyer, and the remedies would be in contract, not copyright.  Given the harsh 
penalties for copyright violation, it seems only fair that the penalty for violating a 
license agreement lies in actual damages against the violating party, not statutory 
damages against any downstream purchaser.
209
   
The ―economic reality‖ test is flexible and well-suited for use in the many 
different types of software and ways people acquire software.  When all the 
circumstances surrounding a transaction are considered, different types of 
transactions may have different results.  For example, retail software purchases by 
consumers could be considered sales as a matter of course, while extremely 
expensive software purchased in arm‘s length negotiations between parties of 
equal bargaining power might be treated differently.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no longer a special need for software to receive protections 
unavailable to other media.  As these other forms of media become increasingly 
digital, it is vital that the protections of the first sale and essential step defenses 
continue.  The Ninth Circuit could help ensure this result by setting precedent that 
ownership of a copy of a protected work is determined not by the word ―license,‖ 
or by license terms that significantly restrict use, but by examination of all the 
circumstances of the transaction.  
 
                                                          
209
 But see Nadan supra note 191, at 578 (arguing that lawsuits for breach of contract ―do not 
provide a meaningful remedy or deterrent‖). 
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